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11 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the simultaneous solution of three problems in cooperative
game theory, namely what coalitions will form, how these coalitions will allocate their joint
payoﬀs among their members and how these two problems are related to the decentraliza-
tion of allocation via competitive prices.
According to Zhou (1994) “the ﬁrst two problems are the two most fundamental ques-
tions in cooperative game theory”. The third problem may be traced back to the alternative
approaches to competitive analysis due to Edgeworth (1881) and Walras (1874) linked by
the Core Equivalence Principle.
Modern versions of this principle are theorems due to Debreu and Scarf (1963), Aumann
(1964), Anderson (1978) and Wooders (1994). While the ﬁrst three of these regard (ap-
proximate) equivalence of the core and Walrasian allocations in pure exchange economies
Wooders’ work is closely related to Shapley’s and Shubik’s (1969, 1975) “direct markets”
where personal commodities of players allow almost identiﬁcation of certain markets and
games. All this literature, however, based on the standard use of the core and, in Wooders’
case, on superadditivity, is not concerned with our ﬁrst problem of endogenous coalition
formation.
It was almost unavoidable that classical game theory largely suppressed the ﬁrst prob-
lem because the usually assumed superadditivity in a context of TU-games made this
problem obsolete. Any payoﬀ allocation that appeared desirable for a potential solution
could be accomplished by the grand coalition of all players. As superadditivity had made
its way also into general NTU-games developed in some articles by Aumann, Peleg and
Shapley around 1960 the framework almost determined already the grand coalition as the
ﬁnal active one. This aspect is reﬂected very clear in the standard deﬁnition of the core
where the forming of the grand coalition is built in the deﬁnition by requiring for any
element in the core attainability for the grand coalition. So, whatever payoﬀ allocation in
the core of a game may be realizable by some speciﬁc partition of the grand coalition it
can as well be realized by the grand coalition itself. Hence there is no need in focussing on
the ﬁrst of the two problems, namely the coalition building.
2The fact that meaningful solutions should allow for the possibility of other coalition
structures than the grand coalition has been the cause for a diﬀerent approach by Thrall
and Lucas (1965). However, there the coalition structure is still given exogenously. The
need for an endogenously determined coalition structure has been recognized by Aumann
and Dreze (1974), who after debating solution concepts with exogenous coalition structure
wrote:
“If the reader whishes, he may view the analysis [here] as part of a broader analysis,
which would consider simultaneously the process of coalition formation and the bargaining
for the payoﬀ..... Our analyis has been concerned with this last topic, and should thus be
understood as a contribution to partial equilibrium analysis.”
Two decades later Maschler (1992) wrote:
“Consider a group of players who face a game. A basic question would be: What
coalitions will form and how will their members share the proceeds? In my opinion, no
satisfactory answer has so far been given to this important question. [The current theory]
answers a more modest question: How would or should the players share the proceeds,
given that a certain coalition structure has formed?”
Zhou (1994) discusses “why there is still not a solution concept that endogenously pro-
vides answers to the question of coalition formation as well as that of payoﬀ distribution.”
After that he formulates three properties such a solution concept should satisﬁy: “(1) It
is not a priori deﬁned for payoﬀ vectors of a particular coalition structure; (2) it always
chooses a nonempty set of some payoﬀ vectors of some coalition structures; and (3) it does
not always contain payoﬀ vectors of every coalition structure”. He then continues. “Given
(1) - (3), such a solution concept will yield endogenously for each game a selected set of
coalition structures and payoﬀ vectors consistent with these coalition structures.”
But Zhou rather than modifying the use of the core proposes a modiﬁcation of various
concepts of the bargaining set in order to deﬁne a solution concept that satisﬁes his pro-
posed three properties. Yet, in contrast to the core that in large ﬁnite economies represents
approximately the competitive outcomes of Walrasian equilibria, the Zhou Bargaining Set
fails to approximately represent the Walrasian allocations (cf. Anderson, Trockel and Zhou
(1997)). It is therefore not suitable for approaching our third problem of relating cooper-
3ative behavior as represented by the solution concept with competitive allocations of the
economy.
Yet, there are already some examples for such solutions in the literature. Neuefeind
(1974) and B¨ ohm (1974) in diﬀerent contexts deﬁne a core without requiring that the set
of all possible allocations coincides with the set of those allocations that are feasible for
the grand coalition. While B¨ ohm does not specify that set of generally possible allocations
Neuefeind explicitly deﬁnes it as the union of all allocations feasible for any coalition
structure. Such a core is consistent with the three properties formulated by Zhou.
The core as a solution, despite its non-existence for certain classes of games, in market
games, when it exists, is often quite large. But market games allow it to look at the
competitive payoﬀs generated in the underlying economy or market that build a subset of
the core.
Shapley and Shubik (1975, section 3) write “The so called “competitive solution” is not
a game theory concept, but is based on the notion of prices ... “clearing the market” to
everyone’s satisfaction”. But for market games such competitive payoﬀs build appealing
points of reference that suggest themselves for comparison with game theoretic solution
concepts like the (inner; strong) core.
As Shapley and Shubik (1975) show for TU market games and Qin (1993) for NTU
market games several markets usually are represented by the same game but may diﬀer
considerably in their sets of competitive allocations.
Two extreme cases are the coincidence of the set of competitive payoﬀs with the core
(resp. the inner core for NTU games) or, coincidence only with one prespeciﬁed payoﬀ
allocation in the core (resp. inner core). This fact has been interpreted by Shapley and
Shubik (1975) as a loss of potentially valuable information on the economic system by
passing to a representing game.
These considerations regard game theoretical modelling as a methodological tool chest
for economics, in particular, general equilibrium analysis. That is also largely the case
for the approach of Wooders (1994). But there is also the converse direction that aims
to analyze cooperative games via tools from economic theory, as for instance equilibrium
price systems. Shapley and Shubik (1975) hint to that direction when they introduce their
4concept of a “direct market” in their section 4.1. In fact they start this section with the
following passage:
“Thus far we used markets to generate games. We now go the reverse route, associating
with any game (not necessarily a market game) a certain “market of coalitions”.” This
comes close to looking at games as markets and to deﬁning competitive allocations in
games. The same view is expressed by Wooders (1994, p. 1143) who writes: “The research
noted above raises the possibility not only that large games and economies ... behave like
competitive markets but also that these games and economies are competitive markets or
close to them.”
In fact there is an instant where prices appear explicitly in games, namely as deﬁning
speciﬁc TU-games as λ-transfers of NTU-games (cf. Shapley (1969), Qin (1993)). And
Shubik (1984, p. 192) hints to the similarity of those λ’s to competitive price systems and
asks for a model in which this relation is formally established. This problem of Shubik had
been solved in Trockel (1996) where the Nash solution that coincides with the λ-transfer
value on bargaining games has been established as a competitive payoﬀ allocation where
the supporting vector λ is a corresponding equilibrium price vector in the game interpreted
as an Arrow-Debreu economy.
It is our goal in the present paper, deviating from most of the literature on market
games, to represent any given TU-game by a coalition production economy in the tradition
of McKenzie (1981), B¨ ohm (1974), and Sondermann (1974) and to relate the resulting
equilibrium payoﬀs to the core. But in order to enable the speciﬁc equilibria to endoge-
nously determine the formation of coalitions we modify the core concept. We deﬁne the
full core of a TU-game υ as the core of its completion ˆ υ which coincides with υ on all
coalitions except the grand one but associates with the grand coalition the maximal sum
of coalitions’ worths that a partition could provide. This corresponds exactly to the core
in Neuefeind (1974) but here in a TU-context.
Rather than interpreting our full core as a new solution concept one should think of
it as enlarging the set of principally possible payoﬀ vectors and making it the new set of
payoﬀ allocations feasible for the grand coalition.
The methodological contributions of our paper as compared with the existing literature
5are the following:
·) We extend the usual market representations of games that are pure trade models or
models where each trader has his own technology by a coalition production economy
where each coalition owns a production possibility set.
·) We consider for arbitrary games υ their completions and thereby create the framework
in that, despite the use of the core concept, we allow for endogenous determination
of coalitions.
Then applying the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem on our new class of complete games
we prove that the full core of any game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoﬀ vec-
tors of the induced coalition production economy provided the completion of the game
is balanced. Moreover, any Walrasian equilibrium determines endogenously an associated
coalition structure for the game.
Formally our theorem can be seen as an extension of Shapley’s and Shubik’s (1975) ﬁrst
theorem from direct market to coalition production economies. It is this richer economic
framework that enables us to endogenously determine equilibrium coalition structures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the full core is deﬁned and
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for its existence is formulated. The main results of this
paper are established in Section 3.
2 Coalition formation and full core
Some general notation is needed in the sequel. For a ﬁnite set K, the set I R
K denotes
the |K|-dimensional Euclidean space where the coordinates are indexed by the elements in
K. Given x,y ∈ I R
K, x · y denotes the inner product of x and y. Let N = {1,2,···,n}
and let e(i) be the ith unit vector of I R
N. For any subset S of N, let e(S) =
P
i∈S e(i).
For any subset S of N and any element x in I R




Let N = {1,2,···,n} be the set of players and let 2N be the collection of all nonempty
coalitions, S ⊂ N. An n-person transferable utility (TU) game is deﬁned by G = (N,V ),
6where V is a function from 2N to subsets of I R
N. For each coalition S, V (S) is a set
of payoﬀ vectors which players in the coalition S can achieve by acting together. It is
assumed that for every coalition S, there exists a nonnegative real number v(S) such
that V (S) = {x ∈ I R
N |
P
i∈S xi ≤ v(S)}. In the following we use (N,V ) and (N,v)
interchangeably.
A very intuitive and fundamental solution concept for cooperative games is the core.
The core of an n-person TU game (N,V ) is deﬁned to be the set of elements x in V (N)
so that there exists no coalition S such that there is some y ∈ V (S) satisfying yi ≥ xi for
every i ∈ S and yj > xj for some j ∈ S.
Recall that a family B of coalitions in a game is called a balanced family if there exist
nonnegative numbers δS, for each coalition S in B, such that
X
i∈S∈B
δS = 1, for every i ∈ N.





A balanced game is said to be totally balanced if all of its subgames, obtained by restricting
v to the subsets of S, S ⊂ N, are also balanced. It is well known that a balanced NTU game
has a non-empty core (cf. Scarf (1967)) and that for TU games also the converse is true
(cf. Shapley (1967)). Shapley and Shubik show that their market games are exactly the
totally balanced TU games (cf. Shapley and Shubik(1969)) and analyze for these games the
relation between the core and competitive payoﬀ vectors (cf. Shapley and Shubik(1975)).
Interesting as it is, the core requires that the grand coalition N must be formed if a
game is played. In this paper one of our objectives is to provide answers endogenously to
the question of coalition formation. For this purpose, we have to consider the situtation
where for one reason or another several coalitions may emerge if a game is played.
A family π = {S1,S2,···,St} of t coalitions is called a partition of the set N if Si∩Sj = ∅
for i 6= j, ∪t
j=1Sj = N, and Sj 6= ∅ for j = 1, ···, t. When t = 1, then we have the grand
coalition N; when t = n, each individual player is acting independently. Let P denote the
7family of all partitions π. Given a game G = (N,V ), we deﬁne an induced game (N, ˆ V ) or
(N, ˆ v) where






ˆ V (S) = V (S), ˆ v(S) = v(S),∀S ⊂ N with S 6= N.
and call the induced game the completion of the game (N,V ). The core of the complete
game (N, ˆ V ) will be called the full core of the original game (N,V ). Note that the full core
is deﬁned free of any particular coalition structure. Therefore, if the full core is nonempty,
then the coalitions of the game will emerge endogenously when the game is played.
Now we will brieﬂy review several closely related works. Aumann and Dreze (1974)
study various solution concepts with exogenous coalition structures. Mas-Colell (1989)
and Zhou (1994) have proposed two diﬀerent bargaining solutions independent of any
coalition structure and proved their existence for general games. However, it appears that
their bargaining solutions are so weak that they cannot be used to achieve our major goal,
namely, the competitive outcomes (cf. Anderson, Trockel and Zhou (1997)). Nevertheless,
keep in mind that the emphasis of Mas-Colell’s and Zhou’s papers is quite diﬀerent from
ours.
A game (N,V ) is called a c-balanced game (meaning completion-balanced) if its com-
pletion (N, ˆ V ) is balanced. As an immediate consequence of the well-known Bondareva-
Shapley core existence theorem, we have the following observation that is crucial for the
existence of a full core in every c-balanced game:
A TU game has a nonempty full core if and only if it is c-balanced.
3 The stylized economy and competitive outcomes








8where Xi = I R
N
+ × I R
N
+ is the consumption set for agent i ∈ N, here for (x,y) ∈ Xi, x
is viewed as input goods and y as output or ﬁnal goods; agent i0s utility function ui :
I R
N × I R
N → I R is speciﬁed by ui(x,y) = yi, namely, agent i is only interested in output
good i; agent i is initially endowed with the bundle ωi = (e(i),0); to each coalition S there
is associated the production set
Y
S = {(x,y) ∈ I R
N × I R
N | x ∈ −I R
N






Thus, there are n consumers, who are the n players, n input goods, n output goods, and
2n − 1 production sets in the economy. This coalition production economy is a simple but
slightly modiﬁed version of McKenzie models (cf. McKenzie (1959, 1981)).
See also B¨ ohm (1974), Hildenbrand (1974), and Sondermann (1974)), for related mod-
els. Note that in the economy each coalition S can be seen as a ﬁrm that is controlled by
its members. By deﬁnition, here every production set exhibits constant returns to scale.
Furthermore, it should be noted that in the economy, the ownership structure of each ﬁrm
is not exogenously given but will rather be endogenously determined by the equilibrium
outcomes.
Given a price vector (q,p) ∈ I R
N
+ × I R
N
+, each consumer i will choose an optimal con-
sumption plan to maximize her utility under her budget constraint and each ﬁrm S will
select an optimal production plan to maximize its proﬁt. More precisely, consumer i solves
the problem
max ui(x,y)
s.t. (q,p) · (x,y) ≤ (q,p) · ωi
(x,y) ∈ I R
N
+ × I R
N
+.
Due to the simple form of ui and ωi, the above problem is reduced to
max yi
s.t. piyi ≤ qi
Firm S solves the problem
max (q,p) · (x,y)
s.t. (x,y) ∈ Y S.
9An equilibrium of the economy is a state in which every consumer obtains an optimal
consumption bundle under her budget constraint and every ﬁrm achieves maximal proﬁt
and the market is clear. Formally, the equilibrium concept is deﬁned as follows.







is a Walrasian equilibrium if the following conditions are satisﬁed :
(1) (q,p) ∈ I R
N
+ × I R
N
+;
(2) for every S ∈ 2N,
q · x
S + p · y
S = max
(x,y)∈Y S(q · x + p · y) = 0;











(5) for every S ∈ 2N, xS is an element in {−1,0}N.
Note that in equilibrium, no production activity makes proﬁt due to constant returns to
scale. The parameter |xS
i | for every i ∈ S can be interpreted as the portion of consumer
i0s willingness or investment to contribute to the ﬁrm S. In equilibrium,
P
i∈N zi is called
the equilibrium payoﬀ vector, (q,p) the equilibrium price vector, and (xS,S ∈ 2N) the
equilibrium coalition structure. Clearly, an equilibrium coalition structure (xS,S ∈ 2N)
deﬁnes a partition π = {O1,···,Ot} of the grand coalition N for some positive integer t.
Namely, S ∈ π if and only if xS
i = −1 for every i ∈ S 6= ∅, and for every T ⊃ S, T 6= S,
there is some j ∈ T such that xT
j = 0.
We are now ready to present and prove the main result of this paper.
Theorem 3.2 The full core of a c-balanced TU game coincides with the set of equi-
librium payoﬀ vectors of the corresponding coalition production economy. Furthermore,
the ﬁnal coalitions of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium coalition
structures of the economy.
10Proof: Let z be an element of the full core of the TU game G = (N,V ). We will prove
that z is an equilibrium payoﬀ vector of the corresponding economy. Since z is an element
of the full core, there exists a partition π ∈ P such that z ∈ ∩S∈πV (S). Let yS = z(S)
and xS = −e(S) for every S ∈ π and yS = 0 and xS = 0 otherwise. Let p = e(N), q = z,







constitutes an equilibrium. Clearly, conditions (1), (3), (4), (5) of Deﬁnition 3.1 are satis-
ﬁed. It remains to check condition (2). For every S ∈ 2N, it is obvious that p·yS+q·xS = 0.
We still have to show that
max
(x,y)∈Y S(q · x + p · y) = 0.
Let (x,y) ∈ Y S. We can write (x,y) = (−λSe(S),y) + (λSe(S) + x,0), where λS =
mini∈S |xi|. It follows that
q · x + p · y = e(N) · y + z · x
≤ e(N) · y − z · λSe(S)
=
P
i∈S yi − λS
P
i∈S zi





i∈S zi + ˆ v(S))
≤ 0.
Note that to derive the above inequalities we have used the facts that λSe(S) + x ≤ 0,
yi = 0 for every i 6∈ S,
P
i∈S yi ≤ λSˆ v(S), and
P








is an equilibrium. Let z =
P
i∈N zi. We will show that z is an element of the full core of the
underlying game. First, note that because the game is a transferable utility game, every
component of the equilibrium price vector p must be equal and positive. Thus, without loss
of generality we can assume that p = e(N). Thus, q = z. Note that
P
S∈2N xS + e(N) = 0
and
P
S∈2N yS = z. Let λS = mini∈S |xS
i | for every S ∈ 2N. We can write that (xS,yS) =
11(−λSe(S),yS) + (xS + λSe(S),0). Clearly, by deﬁnition (−λSe(S),yS) ∈ Y S. Therefore,
P
i∈S yS
i ≤ λSˆ v(S). Note that
P
S∈2N λSe(S) ≤ e(N), yS
i = 0 for i 6∈ S, and that the game


















On the other hand, for every (−e(S),y) ∈ Y S, it follows from condition (2) of Deﬁnition 3.1
that
0 ≥ p · y + q · (−e(S))













for every (−e(S),y) ∈ Y S. Therefore, we have
X
i∈S
zi ≥ ˆ v(S)
for every S ∈ 2N. In conclusion, z is an element of the full core.
As a consequence, there exists some partition π such that z ∈ ∩S∈πV (S). This partition
π is exactly the one that emerges from the equilibrium outcomes. Namely, π corresponds
to the equilibrium coalition structure, (xS,S ∈ 2N). 2
As a corollary, we have:
Theorem 3.3 The core of a balanced TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium
payoﬀ vectors of the corresponding coalition production economy.
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